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Supreme Court Fortifies Qualified Immunity for Law
Enforcement Officers in Warrant Cases
By Martin A. Schwartz

The Civil Rights Act
of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §1983,
affords a judicial remedy to
individuals who suffered
deprivations of their federal
constitutional rights under
color of state law. The §1983
remedy, however, is subject
to an array of immunity
and other defenses. Officials
who carried out a judicial,
prosecutorial or legislative
function are protected from
personal monetary liability by absolute immunity.1
Officials who carried out executive and administrative
functions are protected by qualified immunity.2
Qualified immunity shields state and local law
enforcement officers from personal monetary liability
under §1983 so long as the officer acted in an objectively reasonable manner. An officer will be found to
have acted in a reasonable manner so long as she did
not violate clearly established federal law.3 Thus, an officer who acted unconstitutionally, but did not violate
the plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights,
will be protected from liability by qualified immunity.
Although less potent than the absolute immunities,
qualified immunity is a very formidable defense and
“protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.’”4
The United States Supreme Court in Messerschmidt
v. Millender5 held that police officers who sought and
executed a very broad warrant authorizing them to
search a residence for guns and gang related material were protected by qualified immunity. The Court
assumed that the warrant violated the Fourth Amendment, yet found that the officers acted in an objectively
reasonable manner. The Court relied heavily upon the
facts that the warrant was issued by a neutral magistrate, and the officers who applied the warrant secured
approval for it from their superior officers. Chief
Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote the opinion for the
Court. Justice Stephen Breyer filed a brief concurrence.
Justice Elena Kagan concurred in part and dissented
in part. Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, joined by
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. My major purpose here
is to analyze the significance of the decision in Millender upon §1983 Fourth Amendment claims asserted
against state and local law enforcement officers who
apply for and enforce warrants.
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To accomplish this goal, it is necessary, for starters,
to identify several basic principles of Fourth Amendment and qualified immunity law. Section 1983 Fourth
Amendment claims challenging arrests, searches, and
uses of force by law enforcement officers are normally
governed by an objective reasonableness standard. For
example, an officer has probable cause for an arrest
when based upon the facts and circumstances known
to the officer, a reasonably prudent person could have
concluded that the suspect committed or is committing
a crime.6 Probable cause is essentially a reasonableness
standard.7 Similarly an officer’s use of force in carrying
out an arrest or investigatory stop will comport with
the Fourth Amendment if, under all of the circumstance facing the officer, it was objectively reasonable.8
Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness
standards give substantial deference to the judgment
of the law enforcement officer.9 Furthermore, an officer
who violated the Fourth Amendment because she did
not act in an objectively reasonable manner may still
escape personal liability under qualified immunity.
This is so even though the qualified immunity standard itself is one of objective reasonableness.10 Thus,
a law enforcement officer who violated the §1983
plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights will be shielded
from liability unless those rights were clearly established when the officer acted. Liability will attach only
if the officer violated the plaintiff’s clearly established
Fourth Amendment rights.
This means that a law enforcement officer sued
under §1983 for violating the Fourth Amendment is
effectively granted two levels of reasonableness protection, one under the Fourth Amendment and another
under qualified immunity. To recover damages on a
§1983 Fourth Amendment claim the plaintiff has to
overcome both levels of reasonableness protection.
This is because an officer found to have acted unreasonably for the purpose of the Fourth Amendment
could nevertheless be found to have acted reasonably
for the purpose of qualified immunity.11 To avoid the
linguistic awkwardness of an officer having acted “reasonably unreasonably,” courts normally prefer different language, for example, that the officer had “arguable probable cause,” or made a “reasonable mistake,”
or used force at the “hazy border” of reasonable and
unreasonable force.12
Prior to its decision in Millender the controlling
Supreme Court precedent on the immunity of officers
who apply for warrants was Malley v. Briggs.13 The
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Malley Court held that law enforcement officers who
were sued under §1983 for applying for arrest warrants were not protected by absolute immunity, even
though the magistrate who issued the warrant was
shielded by absolute judicial immunity. The officers,
however, were entitled to assert qualified immunity.
The Malley Court stated that the pertinent qualified
immunity question “is whether a reasonably welltrained officer in [the defendant officer’s] position
would have known that his affidavit failed to establish
probable cause and that he should not have applied
for the warrant.”14 Although a magistrate’s issuance of
a warrant does not automatically establish the officer’s
protection under qualified immunity, “[o]nly where
the warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence
unreasonable…will the shield of immunity be lost.”15
Malley dealt specifically with arrest warrants, but its
rationale applies fully to applications for search warrants as well.16
With this background in place we are ready to
tackle Messerschmidt v. Millender. After a romantic relationship between Shelly Kelly and Jerry Ray Bowen
turned sour, Bowen physically assaulted Kelly and
fired a sawed-off shotgun at her car. Ms. Kelly informed the police about this abuse, and told Detective
Messerschmidt that she thought Bowen was staying
at the home of his foster mother, Augusta Millender.
After confirming Bowen’s connection to Ms. Millender’s residence, and that Bowen was a member of two
gangs, Detective Millender obtained approvals from
his supervisors and a deputy district attorney to seek
a warrant to search the Millender residence for guns,
ammunition and gang related material. The magistrate
issued the warrant, and the search uncovered Augusta
Millender’s shotgun and ammunition.
Ms. Millender (and her daughter and grandson)
brought suit in federal court under §1983 against Detective Messerschmidt and other officers who applied
for and executed the search warrant. The plaintiffs
alleged that the warrant did not comport with the
Fourth Amendment because “there was no basis to
search for all guns simply because the suspect owned
and had used a sawed off shotgun [in the shooting of
Ms. Kelly], and no reason to search for gang material
because the shooting at the ex-girlfriend for call[ing]
the cops was solely a domestic dispute.”17 The officers
asserted qualified immunity.
The United States Supreme Court defined the issue as whether, assuming that the warrant was invalid
and thus should not have been issued, the officers
who applied for and executed it were protected by
qualified immunity because they acted in an objectively reasonable manner. When a §1983 defendant
asserts the defense of qualified immunity, a court has
discretionary authority to first decide the constitution-

al merits—in Millender whether the warrant violated
the Fourth Amendment—or to bypass the merits and
jump right to the immunity question of whether the
defendant officer violated clearly established federal
law.18 The Court in Millender took this latter course
and proceeded directly to qualified immunity. In other
words, the Court did not decide whether the warrant
was valid, but held that even if it was invalid, the officers who applied for and executed it were protected
by their immunity defense.
The Court acknowledged that under Malley v.
Briggs the magistrate’s issuance of the warrant was not
dispositive of the defendant officers’ qualified immunity defense. The Court, however, articulated greater
weight to the magistrate’s issuance of the warrant than
appears to have been contemplated by Malley. The
Millender Court ruled that “[w]here the alleged Fourth
Amendment violation involves a search or seizure pursuant to a warrant, the fact that a neutral magistrate
has issued a warrant is the clearest indication that the
officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner [i.e.,]
in objective good faith.’”19 At another point in his opinion Chief Justice Roberts went even further, stating:
The question…is not whether the
magistrate erred in believing there was
sufficient probable cause to support
the scope of the warrant he issued,
[but] whether the magistrate so obviously erred that any reasonable officer
would have recognized the error. The
occasions in which this standard will
be met may be rare, but so too are the
circumstances in which it will be appropriate to impose personal liability
on a lay officer in the face of judicial
approval of his actions.20
The Court has thus informed the legal world in
no uncertain terms that §1983 plaintiffs who challenge
magistrate issued warrants will be able to overcome
qualified immunity only in “rare” cases. This is very
strong medicine indeed! And that is not all. There is
more in this opinion for which state and municipal law
enforcement officers should be grateful. As discussed
below, the line officers were afforded an additional
dose of qualified immunity protection for having secured approval from superior officers.
Although Malley v. Briggs recognized that in some
circumstances a magistrate’s issuance of a warrant will
not shield the law enforcement officer from liability,
none of the “Malley exceptions” applied in Millender.
For example, it could not be said that the affidavit
in support of the warrant was so lacking in probable
cause that an officer’s reliance on the warrant was
plainly unreasonable.21 Nor was the warrant obviously
deficient on its face. The Millender Court distinguished
Groh v. Ramirez22 on the ground that the warrant’s fail-
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ure in that case to describe the person or property to be
seized was a “‘glaring deficiency’” that rendered the
warrant invalid on even a “cursory reading” of it.23
By contrast to Groh v. Ramirez, in Millender even if
the officers were mistaken that the scope of the warrant was supported by probable cause, their conclusion was not unreasonable. As to the search for guns,
“given Bowen’s possession of one illegal gun, his gang
membership, his willingness to use the gun to kill
someone, and his concern about the police, a reasonable officer could conclude that there would be additional illegal guns among others that Bowen owned.”24
As to the search for evidence of “gang material,” “[a]
reasonable officer could certainly view Bowen’s attack
[on Kelly] as motivated not by the souring of his romantic relationship with Kelly but instead by a desire
to prevent her from disclosing details of his gang activity to the police.”25 In other words, the Court gave all
benefits of doubt to the defendant officers.
That still leaves the most important aspect of the
Court’s decision. The lower federal courts have been
struggling with whether, in evaluating a qualified
immunity defense, weight should be given to the fact
that the defendant officer sought advice of counsel or
approval from a superior officer before engaging in
the contested conduct and, if so, how much weight to
afford.26 As a matter of first impression in the United
States Supreme Court, the Millender Court held that
the “fact that the officers sought and obtained approval of the warrant application from a superior provides
further support for the conclusion that the officer could
reasonably have believed that the scope of the warrant was supported by probable cause.”27 At another
point the Chief Justice said that this factor “is certainly
pertinent in assessing whether [the defendant officers]
could have a reasonable belief that the warrant was
supported by probable cause.”28 The Court did not
decide how much weight should be given to this factor, but, in the author’s view, the tenor of the Court’s
opinion (“certainly pertinent”) indicates that it may
well be a significant factor. How significant this factor
is will likely depend upon the facts and circumstances
of the particular case, for example, the thoroughness
of the information the defendant gave her superior,
the firmness of the superior’s approval, the supervisor’s hierarchal position, and whether the superior
possessed legal expertise.29 In other words, it must be
determined whether reliance on a superior’s approval
or advice of counsel was reasonable.30
The Court’s decision in Millender may well encourage more line officers to seek approval from their superiors. This, of course, would be a good thing. The legal
question will then become the impact of that approval
on the line officer’s qualified immunity defense.
The various opinions of the justices in Millender v.
Messerschmidt illustrate that application of the quali42

fied immunity defense in a particular case can generate significant judicial disagreement. Justice Kagan,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, sharply
disagreed with the Court’s reliance on the defendant
officers securing approval from their superior and a
deputy district attorney. She stressed that all of these
public officials are “teammates,” i.e., part of the same
prosecution team and, therefore, should not be able to
confer qualified immunity on each other.31 She found
the officers protected by qualified immunity to the
extent the warrant authorized a search for firearms,
but not with respect to its authorization to search for
gang material. Like Justice Kagan, Justice Sotomayor
(joined by Justice Ginsburg) thought it is “passing
strange to immunize an officer’s conduct…based upon
the approval of other police officers and prosecutors….
Under the majority’s test four wrongs [i.e., magistrate,
prosecutor, superior police officer, and line police officers] apparently make a right.”32 Justice Sotomayor
would have rejected the officers’ qualified immunity
defense en toto. Thus, while the Court granted the
officers qualified immunity, Justice Kagan would have
granted them only partial qualified immunity, while
Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg would have denied
them immunity altogether.
When all of the pieces of the Messerschmidt v.
Millender immunity puzzle are viewed together, the following picture emerges:
1. The defendant law enforcement officer starts
out with two levels of reasonableness protection, one under the Fourth Amendment, and an
added level under qualified immunity.
2. The officer gets another healthy layer of protection from the fact that a neutral magistrate
issued the warrant.
3. If the line officer secured approval from a
superior or an official with legal expertise (e.g.,
an assistant district attorney), that will further
support the conclusion that the officer acted in
an objectively reasonable manner.
4. In evaluating the immunity defense, the Supreme Court draws no distinction between officers who applied for a warrant and those who
executed it.
State and local law enforcement officers should be
elated with the Court’s decision. On the other side of
the equation, this is not a pretty picture for §1983 plaintiffs who seek to recover damages based upon either
the application or execution of an allegedly unconstitutional warrant. It puts them behind the eight ball, as
they face the uphill battle of attempting to overcome
these various layers of immunity protection. It is not
impossible, but it will take a mighty strong case, like
Groh v. Ramirez,33 where the search warrant was obvi-
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ously deficient on its face, for the §1983 plaintiff to
overcome qualified immunity.
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